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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
V. : Case No. 930009-CA 
JAMIE LEE MORENO, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant.: 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction of possession of a 
controlled substance, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (1990). This Court has jurisdiction 
to hear the appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2) (f) 
(1992) . 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Was the officer's seizure of a paper bindle from the front 
seat of defendant's car based on both probable cause and exigent 
circumstances, the two requirements of the automobile exception to 
the warrant requirement? 
Although the Utah Supreme Court has held that a trial court's 
determination of whether probable cause existed is reviewed under 
a clearly erroneous standard, State v. Rocha, 600 P.2d 543, 545 
(Utah 1979) (applying clearly erroneous standard in reviewing trial 
court's determination that officer had probable cause to arrest 
defendant), its recent discussion of standard of review as applied 
to reasonable suspicion suggests that it will adopt a similar 
stance with respect to probable cause determinations: 
[A] trial court['s] determination of whether a 
specific set of facts gives rise to reasonable 
suspicion is a determination of law and is 
reviewable nondeferentially for correctness, 
as opposed to being a fact determination 
reviewable for clear error. [However,] the 
reasonable-suspicion legal standard is one 
that conveys a measure of discretion to the 
trial judge when applying that standard to a 
given set of facts- Precisely how much 
discretion we cannot say, but we would not 
anticipate a close, de novo review. On the 
other hand, a sufficiently careful review is 
necessary to assure that the purposes of the 
reasonable-suspicion requirement are served. 
State v. Pena, No. 930101, slip op. at 9-10 (Utah February 15, 
1994) (footnotes omitted). 
The determination of whether exigent circumstances were 
present is a factual question and should not be disturbed on appeal 
unless it is clearly erroneous. State v. Morck, 821 P.2d 1190, 
1194 (Utah App. 1991) (citing State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255, 1258 
(Utah 1987) ) . Whether this standard will be reevaluated in light 
of State v. Pena remains to be seen. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not 
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized. 
Article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution states: 
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The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, hcices, papers and effects against 
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not 
be violated; and no warrant shall issue but 
upon probable cause supported by oath or 
affirmation, particularly describing the place 
to be searched, and the person or thing to be 
seized. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
After a hearing in which the trial court denied his motion to 
suppress, defendant entered into a plea bargain, presumably 
pursuant to State v. Sery. 758 P.2d 935 (Utah App. 1988) (R. 43, 
62)-1 He was thereafter convicted of one count of possession of 
a controlled substance, cocaine, a third degree felony (R. 4 9) . 
The court stayed the execution of a prison sentence and placed 
defendant on 24 months probation, on condition that he serve 90 
days in the Salt Lake County Jail and fulfill other educational and 
rehabilitative objectives (R. 49-50). Defendant subsequently filed 
this timely appeal (R. 53). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On the evening of October 23, 1991, defendant approached a 
woman on Main Street in Salt Lake City and offered her $35.00 to 
"party" with him (R. 73). The woman, who was acting as a police 
decoy, agreed and told defendant to follow her in his car (R. 72-
73). When they arrived at the parking lot of the nearby Colonial 
Hotel, defendant got out of his car and locked it (R. 73) . 
1
 The only evidence attesting to the nature of the plea is 
found in the certificate of probable cause, which states: "It is 
hereby ordered that a Certificate of Probable Cause may issue in 
the appeal in the above matter and the plea herein has been 
accepted as conditional" (R. 62) . At no point in the record is 
Serv referenced. 
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Meanwhile, two Salt Lake City police officers, working the 
undercover operation with the decoy, also pulled into the parking 
lot, one in front of and one following defendant's vehicle (R. 78, 
83) . Officer Harris approached defendant, arrested him for 
soliciting, handcuffed him, searched him, and placed the items 
found in the search, including defendant's car keys, on top of 
defendant's vehicle. Harris then accompanied defendant into a 
police car, where he began writing out a citation (R. 78, 83-84). 
Following the arrest, Officer Jackson, who was also on the 
scene, approached defendant's car, looked through the window, and 
saw "a folded bindle, the type you carry cocaine in" located on the 
passenger side front seat (R. 79, 84) . Jackson walked over to 
Officer Harris, who was sitting in the patrol vehicle with 
defendant, and said, "I want you to come back and witness this" (R. 
79). Jackson pointed out the bindle on the front seat to Harris 
and then, taking the keys off the car roof, unlocked the vehicle, 
and removed the bindle. It contained a white powder, which field-
tested positive for cocaine (R. 79). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The police officers' entry into defendant's car in order to 
effectuate the seizure of evidence in open view was 
constitutionally lawful because it fulfilled both requirements of 
the automobile exception to the warrant requirement. 
The first element, probable cause, was established when the 
officer, prior to making any intrusion, observed a paper bindle 
through the car window in open view on the front seat of 
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defendant's car. The officer's observation of a distinctively 
configured piece of evidence was sufficient to establish probable 
cause that the bindle was associated with criminal activity. 
Second, the location of the evidence, presenting an obvious 
invitation to theft and subsequent destruction of the evidence, as 
well as protection of the public from access to the drugs, created 
the exigent circumstances necessary to seize the evidence 
immediately. 
ARGUMENT 
THE OFFICERS' WARRANTLESS ENTRY INTO 
DEFENDANT'S CAR AND SEIZURE OF INCRIMINATING 
EVIDENCE IN OPEN VIEW WAS LAWFUL: THE 
OFFICERS' OBSERVATION OF THE BINDLE PROVIDED 
PROBABLE CAUSE TO EFFECTUATE THE SEIZURE; 
PREVENTING DESTRUCTION OF THE EVIDENCE AND 
PROTECTING THE PUBLIC FROM ACCESS TO THE DRUGS 
CONSTITUTED THE EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES 
NECESSARY TO SECURE THE BINDLE IMMEDIATELY. 
A warrantless search or seizure will be unreasonable per se 
under federal or state law unless it falls within one of the 
specifically delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement. 
State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460, 470 (Utah 1990); Katz v. United 
States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S.Ct. 507, 514 (1967). In Utah, in 
order to fulfill the requirements of the automobile exception to 
the warrant requirement, the State must establish both probable 
cause and exigent circumstances. State v. Morck. 821 P.2d 1190, 
1193 (Utah App. 1991). 
The gist of defendant's undeveloped argument appears to be 
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two-fold,2 First, the folded paper bindle that the officers 
observed on the front seat of defendant's locked car was 
insufficient to establish probable cause to open the car door and 
seize the evidence. Thus, the acts of unlocking and opening the 
car door constituted an unlawful search. And second, even assuming 
probable cause arguendo, no exigent circumstances existed to 
justify seizure of the bindle without a warrant (Br. of App. at 3-
4). 
As to defendant's first contention, probable cause to open the 
car door and remove the evidence was established as soon as the 
officer, prior to making any intrusion, simply observed the bindle 
in open view on the front seat through the car window.3 State v. 
Harris, 671 P.2d 175, 181 (Utah 1983). At this point, no search 
had occurred, defendant had no expectation of privacy in the 
2
 At the suppression hearing, defense counsel referred to 
State v. Hvah, 711 P.2d 264 (Utah 1985) (Zimmerman, J., 
concurring), and Larocco, but failed to engage in any meaningful 
legal analysis of those cases (R. 87-88). Similarly, on appeal, 
defense counsel cites to those cases, but fails to analyze the 
specific facts of the instant case in light of the law established 
by its predecessors. Under the circumstances, this court may 
choose to assume the correctness of the judgment below without 
addressing the merits. See, e.g. , State v. Amicone, 689 P. 2d 1341, 
1344 (Utah 1984); State v. Steraer, 808 P.2d 122, 125 n.2 (Utah 
App. 1991); English v. Standard Optical Co., 814 P.2d 613, 618-19 
(Utah App. 1991). Nonetheless, because defendant has minimally 
raised an issue both in the trial court and on appeal, the State 
will address it on the merits, leaving the judgment call as to the 
adequacy of the briefing to this Court. 
3
 The open view doctrine applies to preintrusive police 
observation, such as is present in this case. In contrast, the 
plain view doctrine is postintrusive, coming into play only when a 
lawful search is already underway. See State v. Harris, 671 P.2d 
175, 181 (Utah 1983); Texas v. Brown. 460 U.S. 730, 738, n.4 (1983) 
(opinion of Rehnquist, J.). 
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contraband, and the federal and state guarantees against 
unreasonable searches and seizures had not yet come into play. 
As the United States Supreme Court observed in a case 
involving a police officer who stopped a vehicle, saw a partially 
concealed balloon, and then shifted his position to get a better 
view: "The general public could peer into the interior of 
[defendant's] automobile from any number of angles; there is no 
reason [the police officer] should be precluded from observing as 
an officer what would be entirely visible to him as a private 
citizen. There is no legitimate expectation of privacy." Texas v. 
Brown. 460 U.S. 730, 740, 103 S.Ct. 1535, 1542 (1983) (plurality). 
The view of the Utah Supreme Court is consistent with the 
federal position: 
The constitutional interests protected by the 
prohibition against unlawful searches do not 
require the police to be less observant than 
the average person. Nor must a police officer 
avert his gaze from contraband because a 
criminal wishes to avoid detection. A desire 
to avoid detection of criminal activity does 
not ipso facto give rise to a protectable 
privacy interest. 
Thus, an officer is not expected to ignore 
what is exposed to observation from a position 
where he is lawfully entitled to be, and he 
may view the interior of a vehicle from such a 
position. That does not constitute a 'search' 
within the meaning of the constitutional 
provisions. 
State v. Lee. 633 P.2d 48, 51 (Utah) cert, denied. 454 U.S. 1057, 
102 S.Ct. 606 (1981) (citations omitted). 
Furthermore, the distinctive configuration of the folded paper 
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justified the officer's belief that it contained contraband.4 
State v. Cole, 674 P.2d 119, 124 (Utah 1983). "Some containers 
(for example a kit of burglar tools or a gun case) by their very 
nature cannot support any reasonable expectation of privacy because 
their contents can be inferred from their outward appearance." 
Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 764 n.13, 99 S.Ct. 2586, 2593 
(1979). Indeed, this Court has specifically held, in the context 
of the plain view exception to the warrant requirement, that 
observation of a plainly visible paper bindle discovered in the 
course of an administrative search is "clearly incriminating." 
State v. Cornwall, 810 P.2d 484, 488 (Utah App. 1991). Under the 
circumstances of this case, the officers' observation of the 
incriminating evidence in open view provided the necessary probable 
cause to enter the vehicle in order to seize it. 
4
 On appeal, defendant argues that "there was insufficient 
foundation that the paper [the officer] saw contained an illicit 
substance" (Br. of App. at 4) . At trial, defense counsel made one 
foundational objection to Officer Jackson's testimony, which was 
overruled (R. 81) . Officer Jackson testified without further 
objection, and then Officer Harris testified without any objection. 
Although inartfully expressed, the gist of defense counsel's 
closing argument and his argument on appeal was that the officers' 
testimony was insufficient to establish probable cause. The 
testimony of the officers, however, plainly established the 
probable cause prong of the automobile exception. Officer Jackson 
testified that he had seen numerous bindles of the type found in 
defendant's car during his three year assignment with Metro 
Narcotics and that many of those bindles contained cocaine (R. 80-
82). Officer Harris testified that he had also been assigned to 
narcotics and had "run into" bindles several times in his other 
assignments (R. 84) . He also described in detail the 
characteristics of the "pharmaceutical fold" used in constructing 
a bindle (R. 85-86). 
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Defendant relies on State v. Larocco for the proposition that 
the police officer's actions of unlocking and opening the car door 
constituted an unlawful search.5 Plainly, just as in Larocco, 
defendant here had an expectation of privacy in the interior of his 
automobile. As the United States Supreme Court has stated: "[A] 
car's interior as a whole is . . . subject to Fourth Amendment 
protection from unreasonable intrusions by the police." New York 
v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 114-15, 106 S.Ct. 960, 966-67 (1986). 
Here, the officers had probable cause to seize the 
incriminating evidence prior to entering the vehicle, just as the 
law established by Larocco requires. The action here did not 
reveal any new information, but instead only secured the item for 
which probable cause to seize already existed. Indeed, the 
officers' actions can be more reasonably characterized as an entry 
into a constitutionally-protected area necessary to effectuate a 
seizure. This distinguishes it from a search, which implies 
looking in an effort to find or discover something and which 
"compromises the individual interest in privacy." Horton v. 
5
 Defendant cites only to the Utah Court of Appeals opinion, 
ignoring entirely the subsequent opinion from the Utah Supreme 
Court. Compare State v. Larocco, 742 P.2d 89 (Utah App. 1987) with 
State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460 (1990) . Furthermore, Larocco was a 
plurality opinion. As this Court has noted: "The precedential 
value of the Larocco rationale is somewhat unclear . . . because 
Justice Durham's reasoning was joined only by Justice Zimmerman. 
Justice Stewart concurred in the result, but provided no insight 
into his rationale. Because he concurred only in the result, and 
because Justice Durham arrived at the result by using state 
constitutional analysis, it is possible that Justice Stewart 
arrived at his conclusion strictly through a Fourth Amendment 
approach." State v. Stricklina, 844 P.2d 979, 985 n.2 (Utah App. 
1992) i. 
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California, 496 U.S. 128, 133 (1990); See State v. Echevarrieta, 
621 P.2d 709, 710 (Utah 1980). 
Nonetheless, probable cause alone will not suffice to justify 
a warrantless seizure. Morck, 821 P.2d at 1193; Larocco, 794 P.2d 
at 470. In addition, the State must show that exigent 
circumstances justified the officer's seizure of the bindle without 
first obtaining a search warrant. Ibid. In this case, the car was 
parked in the parking lot of a hotel apparently frequented by 
prostitutes. This Court can take judicial notice of the fact that 
drug use is often associated with prostitution. Utah R. Evid. 201. 
See also State v. Haves, 860 P.2d 968, 972 (Utah App. 1993) 
(witness was both a drug addict and a prostitute); State v. Taylor, 
599 P. 2d 496, 497 (Utah 1979) (defendant supported her drug 
addiction through prostitution); State v. Jones, 585 P.2d 445, 446 
(Utah 1978) (same). The bindle was on the front seat of the car, 
in open view of anyone who happened to be in the parking lot. 
Under such circumstances, it represented an obvious invitation to 
theft and subsequent destruction of the evidence. Prevention of 
destruction of the evidence, as well as protection of the public 
from access to the drugs, created the exigencies that justified the 
immediate warrantless seizure of the bindle. Morck, 821 P.2d at 
1193; Larocco, 794 P.2d at 469-70 (and cases cited therein). 
The officer's warrantless entry into the vehicle in order to 
seize the bindle complied with constitutional strictures. The 
trial court, however, failed to make any findings of fact in 
impliedly reaching this conclusion and denying defendant's motion 
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to suppress.6 Nonetheless, on appeal, "this court upholds the 
trial court even if it failed to make findings on the record 
whenever it would be reasonable to assume that the court actually 
made such findings." State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 775, 788 n.6 (Utah 
1991) j In this case, because the trial court's denial of 
defendant's motion to suppress emerges from an essentially 
undisputed factual record, this Court may reasonably infer the 
necessary findings to support the trial court's conclusion. Id. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated, this Court should affirm the decision 
of the trial court. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this V _ day of March, 1994. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
JOANNE C. SLOTNIK 
Assistant Attorney General 
6
 After hearing the evidence at the suppression hearing, the 
court took the matter under advisement (R. 88-89). A subsequent 
minute entry states only: "The court having considered and now 
being fully advised in the premises orders said motion denied" (R. 
34) . 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that two true and accurate copies of the 
foregoing brief of Appellee were mailed first class, postage 
prepaid, to Aric Cramer, 4535 So. Van Gordon Way, Morrison, 
Colorado 80465, this 7 day of March, 1994. 
C. JtrhJ^^ 
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ADDENDUM 
3 
March 20, 1993 
THE COURT: Call the matter of State vs. James 
Moreno, Defendant's Motion to Suppress. The record may 
show that defendant is present with counsel John Bucher; 
Mr. Vuyk appearing for the state. 
MR. BUCHER: I would like to call the defendant 
to the stand. 
THE COURT: That's not how we proceed usually, 
is it? 
MR. VUYK: When we have police officers—I don't 
know if they are back yet. They had to run over to a 
trial. 
THE COURT: Your motion places the burden on the 
state. 
MR. BUCHER: I couldn't see them out there. I 
saw them earlier— 
MR. VUYK: They will be back momentarily. If he 
wants to proceed out of order, that's fine. 
JAMES MORENO 
Called as a witness, having been first duly sworn, 
was examined and testified as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
MR. BUCHER: 
Q Would you state your name and address? 
A James Moreno. 5447 Breckenridge Road. 
00071 
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Q Are you the defendant in this action? 
A Yes, I am. 
Q I would like to call your attention to October 
23, 1991, and ask if you have had occasion to come in 
contact with any police officers at that time? 
A Yes, I did. 
Q What time was that, if you recall? 
A About 8 p.m. 
Q How did you come in contact with them? Where 
were you? 
A I was at 14th South and State Street. Actually 
I came—it was 14th Street and Main. 
Q In what city? 
A Salt Lake City. 
Q What occurred at that location? 
A They said I was under arrest for prostitution, 
for soliciting. 
Q Is that the first time you came in contact with 
the police officers that day? 
A Yes. 
Q Did you come in contact with an undercover 
officer prior to coming in contact with the police 
officers? 
A Yes. That would be the one that so-called 
"solicited". 
00072 
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Q When was that? 
A On the same dayr eight o'clock. 
Q And where was that? 
A 14th Street and State* 
Q What occurred at that time? 
A A girl was out there. I pulled up, and I was 
headed to a party. And I asked her if she wanted to go 
party. She said she was working. I said I would give her 
thirty-five dollars to go with me and party. 
Q And what occurred after you said that? 
A She then told me she would, to follow her in her 
car, that we could party over at some hotel or something. 
And I followed her, and when we got over there, she got out 
of her vehicle. I got out of mine. I locked it, and all 
of a sudden, I had officers flashing badges and telling me 
to get back in my car. 
Q Where were you at this occasion? 
A At a hotel on 14th Street and State. I don't 
remember the name of the hotel. 
Q What did they say to you when they approached 
you? 
A To get back in my car, and I said, no. 
Q What did they do then? 
A Told me I was under arrest. I said, "For what?" 
And they told me for soliciting. I said, "I didn't 
00073 
6 
solicit. I didn't solicit nobody." Then they told me to 
put my keys on the car and cuffed me and asked if they 
could go inside my car. I said, "No." They asked me if I 
was hiding something. I said, "No." I just didn't want 
them in my car. 
Q Where were you standing in relation to the 
automobile when this conversation was going on? 
A Away from it, until they made me walk back up to 
it on the back. 
Q What occurred then? 
A I was placed in a vehicle with cuffs on. Then 
they walked up and started the light in the cars. They 
said, "I think he has something to hide or something. 
Maybe that's a bindle or something." They seen something, 
a piece of paper or something and said, "Well, I think that 
is reasonable doubt," or whatever. So they got my keys, 
unlocked it, went through it, came back out, said I was 
under arrest for coke—possession. 
Q Did they ask you for your consent to perform the 
search a second time? 
A Second time, yes. 
Q How many times did they ask you if they could 
search your vehicle? 
A About two other times. 
Q What did they say? 
00074 
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A "Are you some kind of lawyer? Do you know 
something we don't? We have a right to go in there." I 
said, "Well, I can't stop you. You are cops and stuff." 
Q Where was your vehicle parked in relation to the 
other automobiles at the motel? 
A Against the pool, facing north. 
Q Was it parked in the regular place where 
vehicles park for the motel or parked in some other place? 
A There were other vehicles parked around the pool 
area, so I would say so. 
Q Was it obstructing the lane of traffic inside 
the motel? 
A No. 
Q What vehicle was that, that you are talking 
about? 
A *78 Datsun station wagon. 
Q Are you the owner of that vehicle? 
A Yes. 
Q Is it registered in your name? 
A Yes, it is. 
Q Thank you. 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MR. VUYK: 
Q You indicated that police officers asked you 
twice to look at your car? 
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A Look inside, yes. 
Q Isn't it a fact that they indicated to you they 
saw a bindle in plain view on the front seat of the car? 
A No. 
Q Did you make any statement to them with regard 
to the cocaine? 
A No. 
Q You never told them it was cocaine for your own 
personal use? 
A Not until afterwards I said it is cocaine. 
Q How long afterwards? 
A Way after I was arrested. They brought it and 
showed me and was taking pictures of me, and stuff like 
that. 
Q Now, you indicate that you were under arrest, 
and you were handcuffed and you were in a police car; is 
that right? Any question in your mind? 
A With the strap across me. 
Q A strap across you? You were under arrest and 
had the cuffs on? 
A Yes. 
Q That's all I have. 
THE COURT: Anything further. 
MR. BUCHER: Nothing. 
THE COURT: You may step down. 
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MR. VUYK: I would like to call Officer Harvey 
Jackson. 
HARVEY JACKSON 
Called as a witness, having been duly sworn, 
was examined and testified as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
MR. VUYK: 
Q Would you state your name? 
A Harvey Jackson. 
Q Your occupation? 
A Police officer for Salt Lake City. 
THE COURT: First name? 
THE WITNESS: Harvey. 
MR.VUYK: What is your current assignment? 
A I aim currently assigned to burglary. 
Q In October of last year, what were you assigned 
to? 
A Special investigations and vice. 
Q And on that occasion, did you have an 
opportunity to come in contact with a James Moreno? 
A Yes. 
Q How did that come about? 
A Mr. Moreno made a deal with one of our decoys, 
followed her back to the Colonial Hotel. We followed him 
back to the hotel. 
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Q How did your contact come about? 
A We followed his vehicle to the hotel by the 
swimming pool area. Detective Harris was behind them with 
some emergency equipment on. I went around to the other 
side of the swimming pool and pulled in front of Mr. 
Moreno's vehicle. 
Q What happened then? 
A Mr. Moreno got out, locked his door, stood 
there, basically said something like, "You know, what is 
going on, what's happening?" 
Q What happened then? 
A Detective Harris walked up, told him he was 
under arrest for soliciting sex, handcuffed him, took him 
back to his car. 
Q Did you, in fact, search him at that time? 
A Detective Harris didf yes. 
Q Where did that search take place? 
A Beside Mr. Moreno's car. 
Q What was found on him at that time? 
A He had some car keys, some cash and coins, that 
type of thing. 
Q Where were they put? 
A On the roof of the car. 
Q Was Mr. Moreno then removed from that area? 
A Yes, sir. 
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Q Did you then inspect the car at all? 
A I walked back to the car, looked inside. 
Q What did you see? 
A On the passenger side there was, I believe, a 
dark-colored, maybe black-colored cassette holder. In 
front of that looked like a folded bindle, the type you 
carry cocaine in. I went back to Detective Harris and 
said, "I want you to come back and witness this." He 
walked back with me. I took the keys off the roof of the 
car, unlocked it, went inside the vehicle. 
Q What did you then find? 
A I reached down, grabbed the folded paper. It 
was a bindle, unfolded, with some white powder in it. I 
gave it to Detective Harris. He did a field test on it. 
It tested positive for cocaine. 
Q Did you have a conversation with the defendant 
after that? 
A I did not. 
Q When you looked into the car, was this bindle in 
plain view? 
A Yes, it was. 
Q Was the defendant under arrest at the time? 
A Yes, he was. 
Q That's all I have. 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
00079 
12 
Q 
A 
Q 
BY MR. BUCHER: 
Officer Jackson, do you have it with you? 1 
I beg your pardon? 1 
Do you have the thing, described as a "bindle" 1 
1 here with you? 1 
A 
Q 
A 
piece of 
No. 
What did it look like? 
It was a folded piece of paper, looked like a 1 
magazine or something just folded the way they 1 
folded bindles. 1 
Q 
A 
half. 
Q 
inside? 
A 
Q 
A 
couldn't 
Q 
A 
Q 
Q 
1 
Well, how big was it? 1 
Probably about that size, maybe an inch and a 1 
And inch and a half square. Could you see 1 
No, sir, it was colored paper. I 
Colored? J 
Well, like magazine, like it wasn't clear. You 1 
see inside. 1 
Looked like it came from a magazine? 1 
That's what it looked like, yes, sir. 1 
Thank you. I 
REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. VUYK: 
Are you acquainted with this type of bindle? 1 
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A Yes, sir. 
Q How do you have that acquaintance? 
A I have seen bindles many times. I was assigned 
to Metro Narcotics for three years. 
Q During that period was this the type of bindle 
you normally found? 
A Yes, sir. 
MR. BUCHER: Object. Move to strike. I don't 
think there's enough foundation as to his expertise. 
MR. VUYK: He testified he's been a narcotics 
officer for two years. 
THE COURT: Overruled. 
MR. VUYK: 
Q Is this the type normally found? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q And it was folded in a manner you normally 
found? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q That's all. 
RECROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MR. BUCHER: 
Q How many bindles have you seen in your two years 
as a narcotics officer? 
A I couldn't give you a number, quite a few. 
Q Over ten? 
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A Yes, sir. 
Q And out of these bindles, that you have seen, 
how many have been of this kind of paper? 
A I couldn't give you a number on that. 
Q Of the number that you have seen, of this kind 
of paper, how many of them did it later—was it later 
established in court it had a controlled substance inside 
of it? 
A That's difficult to say, sir. 
Q Thank you. 
THE COURT: Mr. Vuyk, anything further? 
MR. VUYK: One question. Were there a lot of 
them wrapped that way that had cocaine in? 
THE WITNESS: Yes. 
THE COURT: You may step down. 
MR. VUYK: Call Officer Harris. 
DAVID HARRIS 
Called as a witness, having been first duly sworn, 
was examined and testified as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. VUYK: 
Q Would you state your name? 
A David Harris. 
Q Occupation? 
A Police officer with Salt Lake City. 
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Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
Your present assignment? 1 
Special investigations, the vice unit. 1 
Were you so involved in October of last year? 1 
Yes, I was. 1 
Did you come in contact in October, I believe 1 
1 about the 23rd, with Mr. Moreno? 1 
1 A 
1 ° 
A 
Yes. 
How did that come about? 1 
We were working a decoy operation. One of the 1 
1 police decoys had made a soliciting sex deal with Mr. 1 
1 Moreno. 
1 parking 
1 engaged 
I followed his vehicle to the Colonial Hotel 
lot. The vehicle entered the parking lot. I 1 
my emergency equipment to stop the vehicle. After 
1 following the vehicle for a little ways, Officer or I 
1 Sergeant 
stopped. 
Q 
A 
. Jackson pulled in front of it. The vehicle 1 
Mr. Moreno exited the vehicle. 1 
What did you do then? 1 
I approached Mr. Moreno, placed him under arrest 1 
for soliciting sex. 1 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Did you handcuff him? 1 
Yes. 
Did you search him? 1 
Yes. 
What did you do with the items you found on him? J 
I placed them on top of one of the cars—whether 1 
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it was mine or his. Mine was directly behind his. 
Q What did you do then? 
A Placed him in my vehiclef passenger's side, sat 
down next to him, began to write him a citation. 
Q He was in handcuffs at that time? 
A Yes. 
Q What happened then? 
A Sergeant Jackson approached me and told me that 
he had something he wanted me to witness in Mr. Moreno's 
vehicle. I got out of the car, and Sergeant Jackson 
pointed out the folded paper bindle, that was discussed 
earlier, sitting on the car's front seat. 
Q What did it appear to be to you? 
A Folded bindle, pharmaceutical-type fold, orange 
in color. 
Q What do you mean by pharmaceutical type? 
A That's what I have been told the fold on a 
bindle is called—a "pharmaceutical" type. 
Q Have you had any experience with these bindles? 
A Yes. 
Q In what capacity? 
A I have been assigned also to narcotics and run 
into them several times in patrol in my other assignments. 
Q They have a special fold, the way they are 
folded? 
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A Yes. 
Q This particular item was folded that way? 
A Yes. It was folded in a little—in a square. 
Q And what did you do then? 
A I watched Sergeant Jackson open it. It 
contained a white powder. I took that, and I had field 
test kits for cocaine. I tested it. It tested positive. 
Q What did you do then? 
A Placed it into evidence, eventually. 
Q What did you do. Did you have any further 
conversation with Mr. Moreno? 
A Yes, Mr. Moreno—just as I was beginning to test 
it, stated, "It is cocaine." And at some point, I don't 
recall when—when I was discussed it, talking with him, he 
said, "I am not a dealer. It was for his private use." 
Q That's all I have. 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MR. BUCHER: 
Q Officer Harris, what is a pharmaceutical fold, 
again? 
A The paper is folded over several times so 
that—I don't know how to describe it. But it folds a 
small square piece of paper so it can hold a piece of 
paper• 
Q Is that it's only characteristic? It is folded 
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2 I way besides that? Let me rephrase it, if you didn't 
3 I understand it. 
4 1 A I understand. 
5 1 Q Is the only way you could tell it was a 
6 I pharmaceutical fold is because it was folded into a square? 
7 A No. 
8 I Q Would you tell me the other reasons you could 
9 J tell it was a pharmaceutical fold? 
10 I A It looked like the fold that I have seen, that's 
11 I been described to me as a pharmaceutical fold on a bindle. 
12 I Q Would you tell me what that is, by size, the 
13 I square shape? 
14 I A I could describe how it is folded. 
15 I Q Would you? 
16 I A You get a square, and you fold it so that it 
17 I makes a triangle. Then you fold the edges over. Then you 
18 I fold the top, then tuck it into the—it is hard—fold the 
19 I top over so it tucks into the bottom. 
20 I Q Is the size of this tucking, the fact it was a 
21 I square—is there any other characteristic so I could call 
22 I it a pharmaceutical fold? 
23 A No. 
24 I Q Thank you. 
25 I MR. VUYK: Nothing further. 
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1 THE COURT: Step down. Is that all the 
2 I evidence? 
3 MR. VUYK: That's all I have. 
4 I THE COURT: What are you claiming, Mr. 
5 I Vuyk—plain view? 
6 1 MR. VUYK: That is right, Your Honor. The 
7 J individual was under arrest, had been searched. It was in 
8 J plain view. 
9 I MR. BUCHER: Your Honor. 
10 I THE COURT: This case that you handed me, it is 
11 la rather lengthy opinion. 
12 J MR. BUCHER: Would you look—the first part of 
13 I it has to do with, I believe, a plea bargain and 
14 I evidentiary problem. Page 16, I believe, begins the 
15 I discussion of search and seizure in State vs. Hyde. I will 
16 I not impose upon Your Honor to read it or even tell you what 
17 I it says. But here is what I think it says. It says that 
18 J in Mr. Lorroco's case, he wants to change the search and 
19 I seizure law of automobile. I believe what this case stands 
20 I for, if you see something inside a vehicle and exigent 
21 I circumstances exist, you go obtain a warrant for it. If 
22 J they saw what was obviously in plain view—a knife, a body, 
23 la syringe, contraband—if they saw a crime or contraband 
24 J leading to a crime inside of a vehicle, that's what plain 
25 I view is. Looking in there and seeing a folded up piece of 
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paper I don't believe is plain view. I believe it is 
reason to believe that maybe something has happened, and it 
could be probable cause to obtain a search warrant. But in 
my view of this case, Lorroco, his predecessor case cited 
in Lorroco, State vs. Hyde, if my interpretation is 
correct, the officers looked in there. They needed to go 
get a search warrant. I don't think it is probable cause 
to see a folded up piece of paper in someone's car. I 
think it was an excuse to search it. I think that is up to 
a magistrate, a committing magistrate, who has the decision 
to obtain a warrant. This man was not going anywhere. He 
was under arrest. There was none of the problems that 
Lorroco talked about, about reaching for a gun before 
destroying evidence. 
MR. VUYK: It is clear it falls under the cases 
where there was a legal lawful arrest. They have a right 
to look at the car and search it to determine whether, in 
fact, there are any weapons or any other type of thing. 
This is the entire process the officers had reason to be 
suspicious when he jumped out of the car and locked it. 
They were surrounded at the time. All this leads to the 
question of what could be done. Certainly, we feel that 
this was appropriate, proper, and done in the process of an 
arrest. 
THE COURT: Let me read this case. I will have 
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you a ruling within a day or two, 
(whereupon the hearing was concluded) 
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